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THE NECESSITY AND LIMITS  
OF KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC, 
WITH REFERENCE TO NIETZSCHE AND HEGEL 
 MAX GOTTSCHLICH 
A RECENT CRITIQUE of analytic philosophy undertaken by one of its 
leading representatives, Peter Unger, 1  highlights the problem of 
whether or not the most common approaches in analytic philosophy—
in ontology, epistemology, and ethics—are merely mental exercises that 
cannot truly claim objective validity.  The discussion to which his book 
has given rise demonstrates that Unger’s account provides an important 
impulse to question some hitherto unexamined basic premises 
regarding the interrelation of logical form and actuality.  In this essay I 
seek to contribute to this discussion by taking it up at the point at which 
Unger eventually left it, and by proceeding two steps further. 
The first step is to give a systematic account of the problem Unger 
highlights by demonstrating the necessity of Kant’s transcendental 
logic.  Kant was in fact the first to show that any ontology that endeavors 
to undertake an immediate translation of formal logic into a doctrine of 
being exercises—in Kant’s terms—the determining power of judgment, 
but without restricting its use to the spatiotemporal manifold provided 
by intuition, which produces nothing but empty thoughts. 
My second step will be to open up a perspective that lies beyond 
Kant’s standpoint with reference to Nietzsche and eventually to Hegel.  
This may provide an idea of the limits of transcendental logic and of the 
objectivity justified by it. 
I 
Kant’s status as a seminal philosopher is commonly regarded as 
rooted in the Copernican turn.  But it is scarcely understood that the 
very center of this turn itself is a revolution within logic.  We know that 
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1 Peter Unger, Empty Ideas: A Critique of Analytical Philosophy (New 
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Kant no longer undertakes the inquiry into being and its determinations, 
but more fundamentally asks about the conditions of the possibility of 
knowledge of objects in general.  Instead of immediately seeking 
knowledge of objects, we seek to comprehend knowledge itself.  In a 
popularized manner this is often described as follows.  In Kant, we turn 
from the inquiry into the nature of true being (ὄντως ὄν), substance, to 
inquire instead about the “subject.”  Now, the latter would be 
misunderstood if we were to interpret this as if Kant had undertaken a 
descriptive inquiry into the given constitution of the human capacity for 
cognition, which would not be revolutionary, for we find such 
reflections in Descartes, Locke, Hume, and of course in later 
epistemologies.  If Kant would have thought in such a naïve way that we 
have to figure out the given constitution of the human faculty of 
knowledge in order to grasp what we can know and cannot know, the 
whole Critique of Pure Reason would instantly succumb to skepticism, 
the very skepticism which Kant wants to overcome.  As is well known, 
Kant did encounter misinterpretations like this, which led him to 
emphasize the difference between mere subjective idealism and 
transcendental philosophy in the second edition of the Critique of Pure 
Reason.2  It would indeed be an underestimation of the significance of 
the Critique of Pure Reason to regard it as mere epistemological 
reflection.  Why?  The answer is that Kant’s fundamental question is, at 
its core, at the same time logical and epistemological.  This is nothing 
less than a revolutionary new account of logical form which can be, in 
the context of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, described as a shift 
from the consciousness of the logical form in its first immediacy (formal 
logic) to immediate self-consciousness of the logical form 
(transcendental logic). 3   I shall now explain the necessity of the 
emergence of Kant’s transcendental logic and its revolutionary basic 
question. 
2 Especially the objective deduction of categories and the “Refutation of 
Idealism,” in Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (hereafter, CPR), ed. 
and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), B274–75, 326. 
3 See Michael Wladika, Nivellierung, Prinzipialisierung und 
Revolutionierung von Erfahrung: Formen neuzeitlichen Denkens, aus dem 
Zusammenhang zwischen Descartes und Hegel herausentwickelt (Würzburg: 
Königshausen & Neumann, 2007), 64–68. 
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(1) If we dare to take a complete overview of the history of Western 
philosophy from Parmenides up to the critical Kant, the question arises: 
what has been its most fundamental presupposition (with the exception 
of Heraclitus and the later Plato)? This presupposition consists in a 
specific conception of the identity of thinking and being—namely, a 
naïve confidence in the ontological relevance of formal logic.  This 
amounts to the presupposition that the logical principles (for example, 
the principles of identity, of noncontradiction, and excluded middle) 
and the form of thought, especially the form of categorical judgment, 
are at the same time principles and forms of actual being.4  So if one 
thinks in strict accordance with the forms and principles set out by 
formal logic, which means avoiding contradiction, one automatically 
grasps being-in-itself.  Thus philosophizing in intentione recta (which 
means that cognition directly focuses upon the object instead of 
focusing on itself) seems to be viable.  Therefore, the logical principles 
are part of ontology.5  Departing from Parmenides’ didactic poem, in 
which actual being is thought as purely identical and therefore free of 
contradiction in itself, everything that cannot be conceived as free of 
contradiction, namely, plurality and becoming, is sheer illusion, nothing.  
We then encounter this premise explicitly in Aristotle. 6   This 
supposition—that is, the concept of identity without internal 
relatedness to its other, to plurality, or of actual being as a purely self-
identical unity that is free of contradiction—is the main feature of all 
Eleatism within philosophy, and the metaphysical basis of all particular 
sciences as well.  Hegel will refer to Eleatism as the “standpoint of the 
understanding.”7  This, as we shall see, is of great importance to our 
4  Hegel describes this standpoint of immediate metaphysics as “Erste 
Stellung des Gedankens zur Objektivität.”  See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline. Part 1, trans. 
and ed. Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), pars. 26–36. 
5  For a systematic account on the relation between ontological and 
transcendental reflection, see Franz Ungler, “Ontologie und 
Transcendentalphilosophie,” in Franz Ungler: Zur antiken und neuzeitlichen 
Dialektik, ed. Michael Höfler and Michael Wladika (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 
2005), 105–16. 
6 Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.3–8; 11.5–6. 
7 “Das Denken als Verstand bleibt bei der festen Bestimmtheit und der 
Unterschiedenheit derselben gegen andere stehen; ein solches beschränktes 
Abstraktes gilt ihm als für sich bestehend und seiend.”  Georg Wilhelm 
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question, for Kant’s transcendental logic will turn out to be a form of 
foundational reflection on precisely this standpoint.  Kant was the first 
thinker to see that the presupposition of this unity of formal logic and 
being was a subreption.  In fact, logic and metaphysics fall apart; even 
more, they contradict each other, as is evident in the history of pre-
Kantian philosophy itself.  There are two aspects of this tension, and, as 
we shall see, Kant was aware of one of them. 
(a) There is a contradiction between the realization of metaphysics 
in the Western tradition, which consists in a contradiction between the 
most fundamental metaphysical concepts or principles, on the one 
hand, and the presupposition that actual being, substance, is 
conceivable as free of contradiction on the other hand.  Concepts like 
κίνησις, οὐσία, ἐντελέχεια, σύνολον, causa sui, monad, and, as Kant 
indirectly shows, the concept of freedom and the “I” have something in 
common: they cannot be conceived other than as a unity of opposed 
determinations (being–nothing, rest–motion, particular–general, 
possibility–actuality, matter–form, unity–plurality, cause–effect, 
determination–indeterminacy, subject–object).  The speculative 
content of these concepts thus demonstrates that actual being contains 
within itself contradiction.  This means that comprehending these 
concepts fully does not mean avoiding contradiction, but thinking in 
order to resolve it, which constitutes the speculative content of pre-
Kantian metaphysics in its enduring significance.8  This point will be 
important with respect to the relevant limit of Kant’s transcendental 
logic. 
(b) The falling apart of thinking and being finally appears as such 
in pre-Kantian metaphysics itself, namely, in rationalism and 
empiricism.  To begin, Descartes was the first to emphasise the problem 
of how we can legitimately assert the objective validity of ideas as the 
central problem of knowledge.  For what reason can we claim a 
correspondence between realitas objectiva (sive repraesentativa) and 
realitas formalis (as mind-independent reality)?  Neither Descartes nor 
the following rationalists and empiricists were able to offer a real 
Friedrich Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I, Werke 
8 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), par. 80. 
8 For the systematic significance of contradiction in view of Hegel’s logic, 
see Franz Ungler, “Die Kategorie Widerspruch,” in Franz Ungler: Zur antiken 
und neuzeitlichen Dialektik, 135–55. 
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solution.9  Therefore, on both sides thought came to a dead end in trying 
to solve this problem, which led to Kant’s Copernican turn.  Let us 
consider rationalism and empiricism in turn. 
(2) To begin with dogmatic metaphysics, Christian Wolff tried to 
discover propositions concerning actual being by means of pure notions 
derived from logically correct reasoning.  But Kant points out that if we 
in this way consider formal logic to be not only a guideline (Kanon) of 
thinking in general, but immediately the organon of knowledge, we end 
up either in a collection of mere tautologies (as in Wolff) or in 
unresolved contradictions.  Regarding the latter, metaphysics has 
necessarily turned out to be a “battleground of endless controversies,” 
as Kant puts it.10  Why is this so?  It is because we can draw conclusions 
that meet all the logical demands of consistency but nevertheless 
generate conflicting results, as in rational cosmology.  How is this so?  
At first, the act of knowing builds on certain fundamental principles, for 
example, the principle that every change has a cause (principle of 
causality).  Now, if one thinks logically and correctly in accordance with 
this principle, one is led to seek totality, or as Kant puts it, to go beyond 
the limit of possible experience, namely, to seek a first cause.  The 
logical relation of cause and effect equally compels one to assert that 
there must be a first cause and that there cannot be a first cause, thus 
indicating that something must be wrong with the presuppositions.   
Kant gained a fundamentally new insight: The pre-Kantian 
metaphysics maintained that the location of the contradiction would 
simply be the world of sensory perception, the world of becoming (as 
first demonstrated in Zeno’s paradoxes), as opposed to the realm of 
pure thinking, and that it is by pure thinking alone that we avoid 
contradiction and grasp the real being.  Kant discovers via his analysis 
of rational cosmology that the unresolved contradiction occurs in pure 
thinking itself.  Therefore, he concludes, formal logic cannot serve 
immediately as a means of gaining knowledge that can claim objective 
9 However, it is necessary to bear in mind that Descartes prefigures Kant’s 
transcendental reflection and even gains crucial insights into the dialectical 
nature of thought, as two groundbreaking studies by Michael Wladika 
demonstrate: Nivellierung, and Breite des Ichs: Systematische Studien zu 
Descartes (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2007).  The focus on the 
reification of the I and the psychophysical problem that dominates the reading 
of Descartes (especially in the philosophy of mind, but also in Heidegger) is too 
narrow to do justice to Descartes. 
10 CPR, Aviii. 
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validity.  This is one fundamental reason for Kant to develop a 
completely new standpoint. 
(3) Empiricism tried to solve the problem of knowledge, too, but 
departing from different presuppositions.  At first, the identity of 
thought and being should be guaranteed by means of a psychological 
approach, assuming a representational relationship between the inner 
world and the outside world.  However, in Hume, the most consistent 
exponent of this view, this approach proved to be unsustainable, which 
is a second fundamental reason for Kant’s Copernican turn.  Why is this 
so?  If every idea or content of consciousness should be proved to be 
grounded in sensation, then not only does all objectivity immediately 
vanish into a “bunch of impressions,” so that something like a common 
world is a fiction, but also the so-called subject is nothing but a 
Heraclitean flow of impressions in which it immediately dissolves.  
Thus, not only metaphysics, but all scientific knowledge and its 
presuppositions, are fundamentally unjustified.  For example, the 
critique of the concept of substance discards the meaning of a material 
substance, which in turn entails the pointlessness of the conservation 
principle of physics.  Causality, the basic principle of all scientific 
explanation, has to be regarded as sheer fiction, too, which in turn 
entails the pointlessness of the principle of inertia.  Generally speaking, 
the logical and the real are completely torn apart.  This skepticism is the 
other dead end of solving the problem of the possibility of knowledge: 
knowledge and its character of necessity actually cannot exist at all.  
Necessity always means a unity of thinking and being.  This is a crucial 
point, because necessity will be the central category in Kant’s 
transcendental reflection, with respect to both the theoretical and the 
practical spheres (general validity, bindingness).  Kant recognizes that 
explaining the identity of thinking and being naïvely in terms of a 
representational theory has undermined itself, too. 
(4) So what is the result?  Departing from the basic premise of 
immediate metaphysics, which is the presupposition of the immediate 
ontological relevance of formal logic, we arrive at empty ideas.  The 
identity of thinking and being, or of the logical and the real, cannot be 
presupposed (this would be the “dogmatic slumber” of immediate 
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metaphysics),11 but turns out to be itself the main systematic problem, 
which gives rise to the new fundamental question of philosophy, which 
is at the same time the main question of transcendental logic: How is 
this identity possible at all?  This is precisely the core question of Kant’s 
transcendental logic,12 “namely how subjective conditions of thinking 
should have objective validity, i.e., yield conditions of the possibility of 
all cognition of objects.”13  The subjective conditions of thinking are the 
logical forms (the form of the concept, the forms of judgment, especially 
the categorical judgment, and of inference) and principles (principles of 
identity, noncontradiction, and excluded middle).  For illustration, one 
may think of the famous example Kant gives in his Prolegomena, in 
which he distinguishes the judgment of perception and the judgment of 
experience.  How can we justify the shift from asserting a mere 
subjective relation of perceptions to claiming an objective relation (for 
example, if we use the logical form of the hypothetical judgment “if-
then” to assert a causal nexus which is objectively valid)?  Under which 
conditions are we entitled to presume that causality, for example, is not 
a purely subjective form of thinking? All scientific knowledge, all 
explanation, all reasoning assumes that.  Generally speaking the 
question is: Under which conditions are judgments that claim objective 
validity possible at all?  What do the subjective conditions of thinking, 
the logical in general, have to do with objective reality, with knowledge 
of objects?  The fundamental presupposition of all scientific knowledge 
is a correspondence of the logical and the real, that is to say, that the 
logical is not merely psychologically valid but also objectively valid.  
Under which universal and necessary conditions is a correspondence 
between thinking or the logical and being or reality possible?  
This is the revolutionary new question of transcendental logic.  It is 
at the same time logical and epistemological.  This is crucial: 
transcendental philosophy is not—as often stated—a peculiar unity of 
rationalism and empiricism; it is not simply an epistemology.  
11 See Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will 
Be Able to Come Forward as Science (1783), in Theoretical Philosophy after 
1781, ed. Henry Allison and Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 4:260, p. 57. 
12 Kant formulates this to demonstrate the necessity of a transcendental 
deduction. 
13 CPR, B122. 
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Epistemology was just the aporetical attempt to bridge the gap between 
formal logic and ontology.  There is no alternative to Kant—the 
immediate metaphysical reflection, ontology, is finished with.14  Kant 
inquires into that which lies behind previous epistemologies, the 
prerequisites of the interrelation of the logical and reality.  Bruno 
Liebrucks, one of the most comprehensive and insightful interpreters of 
Kant and Hegel in the German speaking world, puts it this way: The task 
of the Critique of Pure Reason is to answer the question of the 
significance of formal logic with respect to knowledge.15  The collapse 
of previous metaphysics showed that it does not have immediate 
significance.  But as formal logic deals with the form of understanding 
in general according to Kant, it has to have import with respect to 
knowledge.  Kant’s endeavor is consequently to unfold systematically 
all the presuppositions that guarantee that thinking in accordance with 
the forms and principles of formal logic does not result in mere 
tautologies or lead to contradiction but is objectively valid.  The 
Critique of Pure Reason defines the scope and the limits of the import 
of formal logic in relation to objectively valid knowledge.16  Insofar as 
we assess both aspects (scope and limit), we can read Kant’s 
transcendental logic as an answer to this question: What knowledge do 
we achieve or obtain about being or actuality by means of formal logic? 
(5) Now, if we take this question seriously, we discover that Kant 
engages in a radically new mode of thinking.  All distinctions he is 
exposing are not findings in the sense of psychological or 
anthropological reflections on so-called human nature.  Of course, Kant 
uses the terminology of the tradition, especially of rational psychology.  
But the meanings of the terms change, for they are utilized to develop a 
system of pure positings—namely, positings that are necessary in order 
to guarantee objective validity to the forms and principles of formal 
logic.17  
14 See Ungler, “Ontologie und Transcendentalphilosophie,” 116. 
15 This is shown in detail in Bruno Liebrucks, Sprache und Bewußtsein, 
vol. 4: Die erste Revolution der Denkungsart. Kant: Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft (hereafter, SuB) (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1968). 
16 This is shown positively in the “transcendental analytic,” and in terms of 
its limit in the “transcendental dialectic.” 
17 One must not be misled by the fact that Kant frequently formulates 
matters in an impure way measured in terms of transcendental reflection, for 
example, pointing at “our” faculty of understanding, the “human” 
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So much for the basic question of transcendental logic and its 
necessity.  It is important to see that if one fails to grasp this question, 
one gets Kant wrong and reads him as if he were telling us a story about 
the nature of human understanding along the lines of previous 
metaphysics or epistemologies.  This seems to be the most common 
misconception of Kant in the literature.18  Against the background of this 
question, we can capture the main difference between formal and 
transcendental logic: formal logic presupposes the constitution of the 
objectivity of the object, whereas transcendental logic shows the mode 
of the constitution of objectivity. 
II 
I mentioned above that the Critique of Pure Reason should be 
regarded as a system of positings.  I shall now focus on one that is 
perhaps the most important aspect, namely, the new comprehension of 
logical form. 19   This new comprehension can be presented as a 
conclusion drawn from three premises:  
P1: Logically correct (contradiction-free) thinking ought to be 
objectively valid at the same time.   
understanding as opposed to an intuitive understanding, or in asking: “Now 
what are space and time? Are they actual entities?”  CPR, B37.  This is not an 
accidental failure for it can be demonstrated that this tendency to backslide to 
a metaphysical way of thinking follows from a contradiction within the very 
core of transcendental logic.  See Max Gottschlich, “Transzendental-
philosophie und Dialektik,” in Die drei Revolutionen der Denkart: 
Systematische Beiträge zum Denken von Bruno Liebrucks, ed. Max 
Gottschlich (Freiburg/Munich: Alber, 2013), 69–86. 
18 Schopenhauer is a prominent example.  Metaphysical readings of Kant 
are still far from being overcome; rather, it is the basic prevailing perspective, 
which remains unchallenged even in otherwise most insightful and subtle 
interpretations like Peter Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), or Otfried Höffe’s Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Die 
Grundlegung der modernen Philosophie (Munich: Beck, 2004). 
19 See Max Gottschlich, “Die Überwindung der technischen Auffassung der 
logischen Form – Ein Ausblick von Kant auf Hegel,” in Hegel-Jahrbuch (New 
York: De Gruyter, 2015); and Max Gottschlich, “Logik und Selbsterkenntnis,” in 
Perspektiven der Philosophie (Leiden: Brill, 2015). 
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P2: Pure logical forms cannot automatically present objects, 
therefore a justification of their validity claim is required 
(transcendental deduction, not a mere empirical one). 
P3: This justification requires necessarily establishing an a 
priori (universally valid and necessary) relation between the 
logical form and that we call the object.20 
C: Therefore, the logical must be regarded as forming form, as 
logical activity a priori, which constitutes the identity of 
something as something, the objectivity of the object. 
Let me point to some crucial aspects of what follows from this.   
(1) Kant maintains that we have to posit two sources of knowledge, 
sensibility and understanding.  Broadly speaking, the first deals with the 
matter of knowledge, and the second deals with the form of knowledge.  
It is important to keep in mind that the two sources are not things simply 
found, with which we could perhaps become acquainted via 
introspection, but positings that are necessary to answer his basic 
logical question. 
(a) On “understanding”: Transcendental logic revolutionizes the 
concept of the concept.  The concept is not like an empty box, waiting 
to be filled with content or to be applied to given objects or particulars.  
Rather, the concept is a concept if and only if it grasps something.  The 
forms of formal logic are objectively valid only as functions,21 as modes 
of logical activity of setting a manifold of representations into a unity 
(categories).  These are the concepts of the understanding, and they are 
nothing other than spontaneously ordering intuitive representations.22  
This is the transcendental, which means the experience-enabling use of 
concepts.  The meaning of the concepts (categories), which is their 
objective validity, is restricted to this empirical use.  Thus, the concept 
can maintain objective validity only insofar as the concept is nothing 
other than the activity of determining given matter. 
20 “Die formale Logik stellte die Erkenntnisfrage schon deshalb nicht, weil 
ihre Selbstsicherheit bis auf den heutigen Tag so groß ist, daß sie sagt, es könne 
dem Menschen überhaupt kein Inhalt gegeben werden, wenn nicht innerhalb 
ihrer Denkformen.”  SuB, 420. 
21 CPR, B93. 
22 “Es ist eine der wichtigsten Errungenschaften Kants, gezeigt zu haben, 
daß reine Denkformen, die nicht auf den Verstandesgebrauch an der Erfahrung 
eingeschränkt sind, nonsens sind.  Begriffe, die nicht etwas begreifen, sind 
keine Begriffe.”  SuB, 458. 
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(b) On “sensibility”: Interpreting the formal-logical form as forma 
formans requires the positing of a second, separated stem of 
knowledge: sensibility.  Why?  Because the concept is nothing other 
than the logical activity of uniting a manifold, and therefore it is only an 
actual concept on the occasion of the givenness of the manifold, that is, 
the sensible matter.  “Givenness” means an immediacy which is not 
derivable from the understanding alone.  What is “given”?  Not an object, 
but the mere “that” (Dass) of the appearance.23  Why is the givenness of 
the matter necessary?  In order to overcome the problem which arose 
in Descartes, namely, that we cannot justify the objective validity of 
representations by comparing our representations, on the one hand, 
with “reality,” on the other hand, to see if they correspond.  That is naïve.  
All we have is representations.  So in order to guarantee that 
appearances are not a mere delusion but could be understood as 
experience, as determinations of an object, we must posit this second 
source of knowledge. 
(2) Now, sensibility and understanding must come together—but at 
the same time Kant stresses that all determinacy of the objectivity of the 
object must be regarded as grounded in the understanding.24  The matter 
which sensibility provides must not contribute to the determinacy of the 
object (it contributes just the simple “that”—nothing more).  Previous 
epistemologies maintained that things are determinate, identical in 
themselves, and we have simply to represent their determinateness and 
identity properly.  Then knowledge a priori, strict universal validity, and 
necessity of knowledge of objects would clearly not be possible.  Why 
is this so?  Because we could never know what determinacies will show 
up in the next minute.  This means that the identity of the object, its 
behavior, would never be predictable, controllable.  Only the object of 
appearance can be an object regarded as determinable completely a 
priori.  We have no power over the identity or determinacy of things in 
themselves; we cannot constitute the determinacy of a thing in itself.  
23 What is the mode of being (Seinsweise) of the presupposed matter of 
knowledge?  It has to be posited as absolute position, that is, it is presupposed 
as the nonposited, as the indeterminate ὑποκείμενον. 
24  “als was muß der Gegenstand verstanden werden, wenn er a priori 
erkannt werden können soll? . . . er muß als solcher verstanden werden, der 
von sich aus gar nichts zur Erkenntnis beitragen kann, d.h. als 
Erscheinungsgegenstand, der kein erkennbares Ansichsein hat.  Nur das kann 
von ihm erkannt werden, was nur meine Vorstellung ist.”  SuB, 461. 
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That is why all determinacy of the objectivity of the object has to be 
regarded as grounded in the understanding.  One cannot overemphasize: 
The aim of transcendental logic is to secure the character of necessity 
of knowledge.  From this follows that something like an essence or 
being (οὐσία), which presents itself, which is determined in itself and by 
itself in its appearance, must not exist under the presuppositions of 
transcendental logic, which means it cannot be regarded as possible 
object of knowledge, since the character of knowledge—as being 
necessary—could not be guaranteed.  This is the most fundamental 
reason for Kant’s separation of thing in itself and appearance.  This 
separation does not reflect an epistemological modesty regarding given 
“bounds of sense” (Strawson) for supposed finite human capacities.  
Kant knows that arguing this way would amount to subjective idealism 
or skepticism, which is exactly what transcendental logic seeks to 
overcome from its very outset. 
(3) The most essential point in Kant’s revolutionary account of 
logical form is that he discovers a logical form that was hitherto 
forgotten in formal logic and which has to be regarded as the supreme 
and governing principle of all logical form (the form of understanding), 
which is the pure form of reflection, the pure form of self-
consciousness, the unity of transcendental apperception (I think).  The 
logical I is the principle which governs the uniting of the manifold of the 
representations,25 the absolute form of all knowing and the ground of 
the objectivity of the object.  The forms and the principles of formal 
logic are to be understood with regard to the logical I.  This means that: 
(a) Every particular logical form (category) is a particularization of 
the logical I, since every category is a particular way of uniting the 
manifold. 
(b) The logical principles (mainly the principles of identity and 
noncontradiction) are no longer simply axioms.  According to formal 
logic, the principles of logic cannot be positively grounded or proved, as 
every proof or every syllogism already presupposes these principles.  All 
deductive (as well as inductive) reasoning must therefore ultimately 
25 The synthetic unity of transcendental apperception has to be posited as 
the same principle which provides unity in judgment (metaphysical deduction), 
on the one hand, and unity in the intuitional representations, on the other. 
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rest upon principles which seem to be given “patterns of reason”26 that 
are regarded as per se notum.27  In this sense, formal logic as a whole 
rests upon a sheer positing, and it therefore contradicts itself insofar 
formal logic would claim to be a proper science and not a mere 
technique.  Hegel regards formal logic as an “irrational cognition of the 
rational.”28  This is true given that formal logic cannot ground its own 
principles.  Now, in transcendental logic, thought can proceed a step 
further and enlighten the relative necessity of this positing.  
Transcendental logic reveals that these principles are demands of 
consistency that are to be set in order to maintain or preserve the 
identity of the self-consciousness. 29   This point is of the utmost 
importance for grasping the inner relation of formal and transcendental 
logic.  Transcendental logic clarifies that these principles do not govern 
the understanding as given, external, unmoved movers, as formal logic 
and pre-Kantian ontology ultimately meant them to,30 but they govern 
26 See Paul Pietroski, “Logical Form,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/ 
entries/logical-form.  
27 “[S]ome of the principles will be derived from axioms, and others will 
be unproved (for there cannot be demonstration of everything), since 
demonstration must proceed from something, and have some subject matter, 
and prove something.”  Aristotle, The Metaphysics, trans. Hugh Tredennick 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), 3.2.997a7–9.  See also 
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2.71b26–29.  This axiom is, according to 
Aristotle, the principle of noncontradiction: Aristotle, Metaphysics 
4.3.1005b14–34.  Interestingly, we can find an argument of analogous structure 
in Husserl’s account on transcendental logic.  As opposed to Kant, Husserl 
maintains the primary question of transcendental logic to be “how is logic 
possible?”, and the answer to which should be found in a “phenomenology of 
reason.”  Husserl ends up in an attempt to base transcendental subjectivity in 
something “primordially given,” which is at odds with Kant’s revolutionary 
comprehension of the logical form, ultimately a backlash to a pre-Kantian 
standpoint.  For a discussion, see Errol E. Harris, Formal, Transcendental, and 
Dialectical Thinking: Logic and Reality (New York: State University of New 
York Press, 1987), 89–103, esp. 99. 
28  Hegel’s Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands: 
Humanities Press International, 1995), 613. 
29 CPR, par. 16.  Fichte will demonstrate this more consistently in his 
Wissenschaftslehre (1794). 
30 Aristotle’s concept of the primum mobile expresses that, despite his 
attempt to overcome Eleatism, his concept of substance is ultimately 
dominated by the Eleatism of formal logic.  See Max Gottschlich, “Der Begriff 
des konkret Allgemeinen bei Platon und Aristoteles – Eine Infragestellung 
formallogischer Ontologien?” in Theologie und Philosophie 89, no. 1 (2014): 
19–28. 
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the understanding as posited unmoved movers for the sake of the 
preservation of the identity of self-consciousness.   
From Kant’s standpoint, the positing of these principles loses its 
unfoundedness or irrationality.  The logical form is not an immediacy 
which can be understood as a per se notum, but proves to be a posited 
immediacy.  Furthermore, the positedness of the logical principles 
presents itself in the very movement of thought, for what happens in this 
foundational reflection is that the immediate consciousness of the 
logical form reflects itself and thereby displays the form of immediate 
(or pure) self-consciousness.  Given that, the foundational circle is not 
simply vicious or a manifestation of the “bad infinite” (Hegel) at all.  
Rather, it shows the form of self-presupposition in thinking the logical 
form, and this is nothing other than the form of self-relationality of 
thought—which is the logical I as absolute (self-relating) form (the 
absolute negativity in terms of Hegel’s logic of essence).  Thus, one can 
say that it is in this foundational problem that formal logic shows its 
bounds in thinking the logical form and naïvely points beyond itself 
toward the standpoint of transcendental logic. 
(4) These points together imply a revolutionary account of the 
comprehension of objectivity: The objectivity of the object is nothing 
other than universal or logical subjectivity.  Objectivity is not, as 
common sense believes, the representation of something beyond the I, 
of an object outside us, but a system of necessarily related 
representations.  Therefore, according to Kant, the objectivity of the 
logical form requires the givenness of the matter as a separate source of 
knowledge and a necessary relation of the representations to each 
other.  Again, it is important to note that the limitation of knowledge to 
the object of appearance must not be regarded as an expression of 
skepticism or the modesty of telling a story about alleged finite human 
capacities.  Its purpose is rather the opposite: this and only this 
limitation will guarantee the necessity of knowledge, which means the 
thoroughgoing determinacy of the object.31  Thus knowledge or truth, 
according to transcendental logic, cannot be thought of as adaequatio 
31  Appearance according to Kant is appearance of thoroughgoing 
determinacy.  See SuB, 473. 
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re et intellectus,32 but as the establishing of the unity of the manifold 
under the principle of the synthesis of the unity of transcendental 
apperception.  Kant shows that the identity of the object is an 
objectification of the identity of the logical I,33 which leads us to the next 
point. 
III 
The preceding should make intelligible why Kant can state that 
Wirklichkeit34 is a modality, that is, a way or mode of how we posit 
things or, more exactly, of how understanding posits an object of 
experience.  The “we” does not mean the empirical I, but the 
understanding in general (Verstand überhaupt), governed by the 
principle of the logical I.  It is a fundamental doctrine of Kant that the 
object of scientific experience is not given, but posited.  So what is the 
kind of Wirklichkeit that receives its justification through 
transcendental logic? 
(1) The essential feature of this objectivity is that it must allow the 
formal unity of self-consciousness to preserve and continue itself within 
it.  Kant calls this logically transparent object “nature,” but in a specific 
sense of the term.  Kant distinguishes two aspects of “nature.”  First, 
nature as the sum total of all appearances (natura materialiter 
spectata).  This, taken by itself, would be mere ἄπειρον, matter without 
form.  Second, “nature” also means the sum total of all appearances 
insofar as universal laws govern them (natura formaliter spectata).  
Kant’s Copernican turn demonstrates that these universal laws are 
necessary positings of the understanding that are constitutive of the 
32 See also Kant’s remarks on the “preformation-system of pure reason” 
that do not only aim at the naïve realism or empiricism (Locke) on the one side, 
and Descartes and the “rationalist” tradition up to Leibniz on the other side, but 
rather is a fundamental critique of the complete preceding epistemology: “in 
such a case the categories would lack the necessity that is essential to their 
concept.”  CPR, B168, 265. 
33 Hegel will refer to this standpoint—that of “determining reflection”—in 
his logic as follows: “Determinate being is merely posited being or 
positedness; this is the proposition of essence about determinate being.”  
Hegel’s Science of Logic, 406. 
34  Which, in Hegel’s terms, means Realität.  Reality, as opposed to 
actuality, signifies the “world of appearances” in the Kantian sense. 
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objectivity of an object in general.35  This objectivity of the object is its 
identity or determinacy, which is neither simply given nor based in the 
object itself qua substance but posited as, one might say, objectivation 
of the logical I, of general subjectivity.  And it is because of this identity 
that, for example, this tree here and now has not immediately vanished 
into the Heraclitean flow of sensual perception, but can be determined 
as a something of a kind.  This identity is, according to Kant, a function 
of the power of judgment, that is, the objectifying determination by 
subsuming individuals as instances of a general rule or type.  So Kant 
shows that the belief of common sense (in everyday life as well as in 
science) that there are given, identifiable things has a transcendental 
origin.   
Thus, the objectivity Kant is grounding is explicitly neither the 
world of the sensory perception nor the φύσις or οὐσία αἰσθητή of the 
Aristotelian ontology.  Necessary knowledge of objects is not possible 
with regard to a thing in itself, but only with regard to a coherent, 
contradiction-free, and therefore unequivocally determinable system of 
appearances.  This is nothing other than the object of modern natural 
science.  Kantian objectivity is not an object of possible sense 
perception but an object of the understanding; it is not single things as 
substances but the things as appearances, which means only insofar as 
their determinacy can be explained in terms of their being nothing more 
than functional elements in a law-governed system of appearances.36  
For example: the objectivity or identity of water in this sense is not 
a thing that we can point to in sense perception, but the thought of H2O.
37  
H2O appears in different so-called states of aggregation (fluid, steam, 
and so on), and this appearance is not contingent but necessary.  Ice will 
predictably melt under certain circumstances.  But this means that the 
identity or determinateness of a given state of aggregation is grounded 
only in a system of appearances.  Ice melts in relation to a heat source.  
In other words, water as H2O has, as its scientific name denotes, its 
identity not in itself but in the periodic table of elements and the laws of 
chemical reaction, which in turn are determined within the system of all 
natural laws. 
35 As demonstrated in the “System of principles of pure understanding.” 
36 See the step from “perception” to “force and understanding” in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit. 
37  See Thomas Sören Hoffmann, G. W. F. Hegel—Eine Propädeutik 
(Wiesbaden: Marix, 2012), 262–63. 
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It is important to note that in this perspective all phenomena 
(individuals, particulars) as appearances must not have something like 
an identity within themselves, an internal or imminent identity which 
presents itself in the way a thing changes or reacts, as previous ontology 
conceived it.  To put the point more sharply, they are not selves at all, 
that is, they have no internal self-relation.  Rather, they are merely 
functional elements in a system, and their identity or determinateness 
is rooted only in this system of appearances.  The Leibnizian 
principium identitatis indiscernibilium, which aimed at the concrete 
identity of an individual (in Aristotelian terms, the τόδε τι), must be 
regarded as negligible for the object of experience.  This is precisely 
what happens, for example, in generating “objective knowledge” about 
specific natural laws by means of methodical experiment.   
“Nature” in this sense is the world as purely objective objectivation, 
the modelled reality of the natural sciences.  Thus Kant answers the 
question of the importance of formal logic in relation to objective 
knowledge as follows: The principles and forms of formal logic provide 
knowledge only in relation to this form of objectivity.38  The world of 
appearance is a world which is established in such a way that the self-
identity of the I can preserve itself without contradiction, a world that 
is logically completely transparent (as opposed to the φύσις of previous 
ontology, which features a lasting “otherness” insofar as it has been 
conceived as presence of another “self”).39  
Now, we must not think that this is only a matter of the scientific 
worldview.  The logic of objectification or identification with which the 
transcendental logic deals is of course a matter of our everyday life, too.  
Without this objectification, human beings could not survive 
biologically.  It is the basis of all knowledge which allows us to orient 
ourselves in the world.  We are always trying to integrate the objects we 
experience into contradiction-free models in order not to lose our mind 
(the understanding).  So we may generally say that transcendental logic 
demonstrates the conditions of all technical-practical conduct.40 
38 Apart from Kant’s foundation of mathematics. 
39  See Thomas Sören Hoffmann, “Gezeigte versus sich zeigende Natur. 
Eine Skizze im Blick auf das Verhältnis von Labor und Natur,” in Philosophia 
Naturalis 43, no. 1 (2006): 142–67. 
40 This is a central issue for ethics: To what extend can we allow ourselves 
to regard a person as a mere functional element, which is to say as a means to 
our ends, as an object? 
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(2) In showing this, Kant’s transcendental logic unveils the hitherto 
hidden teleological character of formal logic, its imperative character: 
formal logic is the logic of knowledge for the sake of domination, of 
control.  The goal of modern mathematical natural science is knowledge 
that can be applied.  The transcendental logic shows that this is made 
possible only because this object, the world of appearance, is not alien 
but thoroughly constituted by the logical I.  There is no principal opacity 
in the objectivity of the natura formaliter spectata.  It is a logically 
transparent world.  This enables prognosis, and prognosis enables 
technical mastery of nature.  I can control something completely only if 
I am able to predict action and reaction a priori.  This is the one side, 
namely, that Kant’s transcendental logic shows under which conditions 
this knowledge of domination is possible.  According to the second 
postulate of empirical thinking, the object of this knowledge alone is 
actual in a strict sense.41 
(3) The other side is that Kant shows within the Critique of Pure 
Reason the limitation of the technical-practical form of knowledge and 
its legitimate sphere of application (we could also say, of instrumental 
reason).  Formal logic cannot be a tool for gaining knowledge of 
substance in the sense of the traditional ontology, which in Kant has to 
be regarded as the unknown X.  We cannot dominate a thing-in-itself but 
only the thing as appearance, which means insofar as it can be 
understood as a functional element in a system according to laws.  This 
object is posited as thoroughly determinable by the understanding.42  It 
is of the utmost import to emphasize this side, for already in the 
Critique of Pure Reason Kant clears the way for relativizing the 
theoretical “instrumental” reason as merely a means to practical reason, 
which itself has primacy.  The proper relation of mere technical and 
practical reason is articulated in the humanity formulation of the 
categorical imperative, for example.  Technical-practical knowledge is 
nevertheless a condition of realizing practical reason, for without the 
determinacy of the object, without identification of something as 
something, acting that realizes practical reason would not possible.  The 
third Critique will provide the insight that it is the sphere of internal 
41 CPR, B266. 
42 “Erkenntnis bei Kant ist immer Erkenntnis von positiven Gegenständen.  
Die Erkenntnis besteht in nichts anderem als der Verwandlung des 
angeschauten Wahrnehmungsgegenstandes in den entweder direkt oder 
wenigstens indirekt anschaubaren Erfahrungsgegenstand.”  SuB, 70. 
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finality or self-relatedness which opens up beyond the sphere of 
knowledge in the precise sense of the Critique of Pure Reason.  This 
point will be important to keep in mind when we come to Hegel.  We 
shall now face the limits of transcendental logic. 
IV 
Nietzsche’s remarks on logic are of great interest for the 
enlightenment of the logical form because he questions the self-reliance 
of logic in general and of formal logic in particular, so as to reveal that 
there is a hidden relation of formal logic, science, and metaphysics to 
the domination of life.43  I shall focus on following remark, which seems 
not to have received the attention it deserves from contemporary 
philosophy of logic:44 
If, according to Aristotle, the principle of non-contradiction is the 
most certain of all principles, if it is the final and most fundamental 
one upon which all proofs are based, if the principle of all other 
axioms lies within it: then one ought to examine all the more 
carefully what it actually presupposes in the way of theses.  Either, 
as if it already knew the real from somewhere else, it asserts 
something with respect to the real, to what is: namely, that opposite 
predicates cannot be ascribed to the real.  Or does the principle mean 
that opposite predicates shall not be ascribed to it?  Then logic would 
be an imperative, not to know the true, but to posit and arrange a 
world that shall be called true by us. 
In short, the question remains open: are the axioms of logic adequate 
to the real, or are they measures and means to create for us the real, 
the concept ‘reality’? . . .  But to be able to affirm the former one 
would, as I have said, already need to be acquainted with what is; and 
43 A luminous study on Nietzsche’s basic concepts and their relation to 
Kant and Hegel is given by Heinz Röttges, Nietzsche und die Dialektik der 
Aufklärung (New York: De Gruyter, 1972). 
44 Profound accounts on Nietzsche’s view on logic can be found in Steve 
D. Hales, “Nietzsche on Logic,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
56, no. 4 (1996): 819–35; and in the chapter “Die Wirkung des formellen 
Denkens und der Verstandeskategorien als Wahrheit,” in Günter Abel, 
Nietzsche: Die Dynamik der Willen zur Macht und die ewige Wiederkehr 
(New York: De Gruyter, 1998), 329–34.  Michael S. Green has shown that 
Nietzsche’s account of logic (amongst other topics) is indebted by his reading 
of the Russian logician Afrikan Spir in Nietzsche and the Transcendental 
Tradition (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 87–89. 
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that’s simply not the case.  The principle thus contains not a criterion 
of truth, but rather an imperative about what shall count as true. 
Supposing there were no identical with itself, such as that 
presupposed by every logical (including mathematical) principle, 
supposing A were already an illusion, then logic would have as its 
presupposition merely illusory world.  And indeed we believe in that 
principle under the impression of endless experience which seems 
continually to confirm it.  The ‘thing’—that is the real substratum of 
A: our belief in things is the precondition of our belief in logic.  The 
A of logic is, like the atom, a re-construction of the ‘thing’. . . .  By not 
grasping that, and by making of logic a criterion of true being, we are 
well on the way to positing all those hypostases—substance, 
predicate, object, subject, action, etc.—as realities: i.e., to conceiving 
a metaphysical world, i.e., a ‘true world’ (—but this is the illusory 
world once again).45 
(1) Nietzsche conceives formal logic as related to our “belief in 
things,” and it is by means of formal logic that we posit a “thing.”  We 
posit identity, a self-identical essence as substrate which we call a 
“thing.”  Nietzsche seems to be aware of the fact that the principle of 
identity has its significance essentially in the positing of objective 
determinacy, as well as of the connection between the form of 
categorical judgment (every predicate must have an underlying subject) 
and its function in the category of inherence-subsistence qua thing-
property.  Accordingly, Nietzsche supposes that all former metaphysics 
as well as all exact science are based upon formal logic.  Kant would 
agree.  But unlike Kant, Nietzsche stresses that the concepts we build 
up via logic are sheer positings, hypostases.  By “hypostasis” we mean 
something that is factually ontologically dependent and yet is regarded 
as if it could exist on its own.  Trying to conceptualize actuality 
conceived as becoming via logic results in one-sided abstractions.  This 
is consistent reasoning: If actuality or life is conceived as becoming, 
then it cannot be conceived as free of contradiction.  Therefore, the 
model of a world which is free of contradiction amounts to a perversion 
of actuality or, according to Nietzsche, the expression of the will to 
dominate life.  For this reason, formal logic cannot serve as an organon 
of knowledge of actuality.  Presupposing or trying to guarantee the unity 
45 Friedrich Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, in Cambridge 
Texts in the History of Philosophy, ed. by Rüdiger Bittner, trans. Kate Sturge 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 157–58.  The original version 
can be found in Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente. Herbst 1887, 
in Nietzsche Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, vol. 8 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
1970), 54. 
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of formal logic and reality is, according to Nietzsche, the path into error 
insofar it leads us to project mere delusive entities onto actuality. 
(2) Although logic leads us to produce hypostases, we—that is, 
common sense, science, and metaphysics—have the belief that these 
positings present the actual world; but in doing so, we mistake mere 
models of actuality, the “metaphysical” worlds, for actual actuality.  This 
reasoning overlaps with Kant: Formal logic cannot serve as a means of 
gaining knowledge of the thing-in-itself, but only of the thing as 
appearance, which is contradiction-free.  If Nietzsche stresses that one 
should not think this kind of object one believes in already presents 
actual actuality, Kant would agree, by saying that this is why he 
emphasizes the distinction between an appearance and a thing-in-itself.  
This point is crucial, because forgetting this difference would mean 
lapsing back into a pre-Kantian account of the relation of formal logic 
to reality (which prevails today in analytical ontologies), which leads to 
the absolutizing of formal logic. 
(3) In regard to the problem of the absolutizing of formal logic, 
Nietzsche provides an important insight which goes beyond the horizon 
of Kant’s transcendental logic, namely, that the force of reaction, which 
is basically the will to dominate life, necessarily destroys itself, for it 
recoils on itself.  This point addresses the dialectic of the absolutizing 
of the technical-practical, which consists in the domination of the 
means over the end.  For this reason Nietzsche’s thought can be 
regarded as a contribution to the philosophy of technology. 
(4) Let us turn to Nietzsche’s account of transcendental logic.  His 
central argument can be found in the following remark: To think that we 
prescribe laws to “nature” would be the summation of a host of errors 
of understanding (die Aufsummierung einer Menge von Irrtümern des 
Verstandes).46  Nietzsche regards Kant’s transcendental logic to be the 
very summit of error.  Why is this so?  It is important to keep in mind 
two mutually connected things: 
(a) A general aspect: Nietzsche, it seems, was not concerned only 
to overcome the metaphysical standpoint (like Kant).  Additionally—
and this seems to be a fundamental motive of his critique of Kant’s 
46 See Friedrich Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, in Nietzsche 
Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe (hereafter, Werke), ed. Giorgio Colli and 
Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: De Gryter, 1967), Aphorismus 19, 37. 
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theoretical and practical philosophy as a whole—he wanted to go a step 
further, to elucidate the hidden nihilism in that which Hegel called the 
philosophy of reflection.47  In this context one could also think about 
Nietzsche’s emphasis on the opacity of the self.  I think it is helpful to 
relate this to Hegel’s logic.  Nietzsche was not only aiming to prove that 
being is illusory; he also had a sense, to use Hegel’s words, that seeming 
itself is seeming.  This point overlaps with Hegel.  But unlike Hegel, 
Nietzsche puts all emphasis on the purely illusory character of being in 
his critique of metaphysics.  Hegel would say that Nietzsche stops short 
at the sheer immediacy of seeming, whereas his logic of essence 
demonstrates the progressive reacquisition or manifestation of being 
within the movement of seeming.  As to Nietzsche’s critique of Kant, 
Hegel could argue that it is right to claim that the movement of seeming 
or reflection will finally lead to the thought that seeming itself is 
seeming, which means positively that seeming has to be thought of as 
appearance of the essence.  Yet Hegel could also say that Nietzsche’s 
brilliant hints focus solely on the immediate or negative aspect, namely, 
the self-dissipation of the standpoint of reflection, whereas his logic of 
essence tries to reveal the way to actuality.  Thus, the only way for 
Nietzsche to overcome the standpoint of reflection so as to get in touch 
with actuality within thought (to achieve a nonreductive 
comprehension of the unity of thought and being) is to skip to the notion 
of life and stick with it.  Life, of course, really does point beyond the 
standpoint of reflection.48  But then again, life is only the immediacy of 
the unity of subject and object, which taken on its own is not sufficient 
to comprehend human actuality.  It is therefore necessary for Nietzsche 
to stress the significance of prereflexivity, the opacity of the self.49  (It 
would be an interesting task to relate the notion of reflection and 
47 Which is systematically topical in philosophy since Jacobi’s allegation of 
nihilism regarding Fichte.  See Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Über das 
Unternehmen des Kritizismus, die Vernunft zu Verstande zu bringen und 
der Philosophie überhaupt eine neue Absicht zu geben, in Friedrich Heinrich 
Jacobi, Schriften zum transzendentalen Idealismus, Werke, vol. 2, ed. Walter 
Jaeschke and Irmgard-Maria Piske (Hamburg: Meiner, 2004). 
48 Consider the problems that arise in respect of thinking life as internal 
finality in the third Critique or the significance of the notion life for the early 
Hegel. 
49  The true self is life as “great reason,” realized as body (Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, first part, 4), which shall be ultimately 
intransparent to us. 
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negativity in Hegel to Nietzsche; it seems to me that Nietzsche’s 
standpoint could be regarded as a result of insisting on the immediacy 
of negativity.) 
(b) The second aspect is that due to his account of negativity or 
reflection, Nietzsche misses Kant’s thought.  So if Nietzsche argues that 
prescribing laws to “nature” by the understanding would be the summit 
of error, he shows that he has apparently conflated “nature” qua thing-
in-itself and “nature” qua system of appearances.  Of course Kant was 
well aware that such a form of “prescription” to things-in-themselves 
would be nonsense.  It seems that this misconception of Kant in 
Nietzsche arises due to the latter’s criticism of the standpoint of 
reflection as ultimately merely a matter of delusion.  Kant would dispute 
this point of Nietzsche’s by saying: Appearance in my sense is not a 
delusion; on the contrary, it is the sphere of strict and objective 
necessity in knowledge. 
(5) This problematic account of seeming or reflection leads to the 
rise of a contradiction in Nietzsche’s own standpoint.  On the one hand, 
Nietzsche suggests that the application of formal logic to actuality leads 
to sheer hypostases detached from actuality, and even more it is 
completely misleading in regard to actuality qua life.  On the other hand, 
Nietzsche is one of the few philosophers to comprehend the hidden 
teleological character of formal logic, for example, in asserting that 
formal logic is an “imperative, not to know the true, but to posit and 
arrange a world that shall be called as true by us.”  So this passage 
suggests that Nietzsche was aware of the character of formal logic as an 
imperative.  Formal logic—as basis of all science—does not lead to 
absolute nothingness but rather enables us to gain control over the 
becoming of life, to domesticate, to govern it.  Indeed, Nietzsche wants 
to uncover the construction of our scientific view of the world by means 
of logic as a mighty tool of domination.  Kant would agree with this by 
responding: Transcendental logic demonstrates exactly the 
preconditions under which we can gain objective knowledge qua 
knowledge that may serve to dominate actuality.  But Nietzsche, as Kant 
could carry on, fails to comprehend the notion of appearance.  
Therefore it must remain a mystery to him as to how playing with sheer 
hypostases could ever enable us to gain actual power over “nature”—
things as appearances.  A system of appearances indeed is a modelled 
actuality.  But he overemphasizes the modelling.  If it were mere 
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delusion, it could never have served as a proper means for the force of 
reaction and resentment.  Without a logically shaped system of 
appearances, the “will to power” would have never been able to realize 
itself in space and time; self-conscious life could not have preserved 
itself. 
(6) This problem is aggravated by the way in which Nietzsche aims 
to reduce logic to language.  Why do we believe in things and in formal 
logic?  Because this belief is nothing more than a disguised belief in the 
grammatical structure of our particular and contingent language. 50  
Now, Kant could counter this by saying that a “belief in things” is a 
projection, but a necessary projection.  It is rooted in the fact that we 
can acquire objective knowledge of things as appearances.  One could 
say, the controllability of things as appearances explains why this belief 
is deeply rooted.  That is why we tend to forget the critical difference 
between appearance and thing-in-itself and regard formal logic as the 
organon of knowledge.  Instead, for Nietzsche the final result is the 
following: “The belief in the categories of reason [purpose, unity, being, 
M.G.] is the cause of Nihilism—we have measured the worth of the 
world according to categories which can only be applied to a purely 
fictitious world.”51  This is a negation or denial of the logical character 
of being in general, which expresses itself as linguistic relativism or 
perspectivism. 52   The theoretical Kant would counter that with 
perspectivism, one ends up in exactly the spot he wanted to escape 
from, namely, at Hume’s bundle of perceptions, the becoming of 
impressions.  This standpoint is self-dissolving, and the transcendental 
logic aims to overcome it.  If Nietzsche were right, how could he explain 
the possibility of technical mastery of nature at all?  
50  Formal logic has no autonomy, according to Nietzsche, because its 
forms and principles are relative to the grammar of particular languages.  See 
Josef Simon, “Grammar and Truth: On Nietzsche’s Relationship to the 
Speculative Sentential Grammar of the Metaphysical Tradition,” trans. Babette 
Babich, in Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science  203 (1999): 129–51.  
51  “Resultat: der Glaube an die Vernunft-Kategorien [Zweck, Einheit, 
Sein, M.G.] ist die Ursache des Nihilismus,—wir haben den Werth der Welt an 
Kategorien gemessen, welche sich auf eine rein fingierte Welt beziehen.“  
Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente, in Werke, sec. 8, vol. 2, p. 291. 
52  The dissipation of the logical in embracing perspectivism can be 
regarded as the appropriate way of expressing this actuality. 
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Nietzsche’s merit, especially with regard to his account on logic, is 
to unveil this standpoint as “will to power,” which finds its expression 
as pragmatism, perspectivism, and nihilism.  His enlightenment of logic 
shares fundamental motives with Kant while failing to recognize the 
necessity of Kant’s reflections.  In Hegel’s terms: Nietzsche’s philosophy 
reflects the logical status of essence.  He seeks to elucidate the seeming 
character of being, but he fails to recognize the progress in the Kantian 
reflection due to his “metaphysical” premises that tend to a mere 
abstract negation of the logical form and its necessity.53  So we have to 
look for a systematically deeper insight. 
V 
Hegel’s logic of essence shows the legitimacy of Kant’s standpoint 
as well as how logically to overcome the standpoint of reflection, which 
is, as Nietzsche has pointed out indirectly, in itself nihilistic.  By doing 
so, Hegel goes beyond Nietzsche and shows how to grasp actuality, 
neither in a one-sided objective mode (the objectivity which is founded 
by transcendental logic) nor in a one-sided subjective mode (an 
actuality which can also be no real self as it is only as immediately 
fractured into perspectives, its being for others, as in Nietzsche).  In 
order to concretize this reflection, we shall finally draw our attention to 
Hegel’s notion of “actuality.”54 
53 Nietzsche’s critique is not far from Protagoras’s denial of the necessity 
of the principle of noncontradiction.  See Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.4–8.  It is 
important to note that Aristotle’s argument is neither sidelined, undermined, 
nor undone by Nietzsche nor by modern nonclassical formal logics (like 
paraconsistent logic); for first, the “denial” of the principle of noncontradiction 
is nothing but a technical decision in order to generate a specific functionality 
of a calculus; and second, every “proposition” in the construction of a 
nonclassical logic presupposes and recognizes the principle of 
noncontradiction, since it is not proposing a and –a at the same time, which 
would be “the principle of noncontradiction is valid” and, at the same time, “the 
principle of noncontradiction is not valid.” 
54 See the third section of the “logic of essence” in Hegel’s Science of Logic, 
529–71.  For an insightful overview on this crucial section, see Hoffmann, Hegel, 
348–59; for the overcoming of the immediacy of reflection or mediation itself 
(that is, the standpoint of transcendental reflection), see Stephen Houlgate, 
“Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic,” in A 
Companion to Hegel, ed. Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur (Chichester: 
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(1) At first, it must be astonishing to encounter a category called 
Wirklichkeit within a logic.  It is one thing to talk edifyingly about 
actuality, to swear to the reader that something would be the actual 
actuality, or to give attentive phenomenological descriptions of it; and 
it is another thing to catch up with actuality within logic.  Hegel’s logic 
of essence accomplishes two tasks:  
(a) The standpoint of reflection, which corresponds to 
transcendental philosophy, is consistently thought through to its end;  
(b) In doing so, Hegel is the first philosopher to restore and unfold 
the logical significance of a series of speculative concepts originating 
from pre-Kantian metaphysics.   
(2) As the category Wirklichkeit unfolds the content of the 
Aristotelian concept of ἐνέργεια, we shall enter into Hegel’s logic by 
recalling the meaning of this term. 55   At first, ἐνέργεια (Latin: actus, 
actuality) is opposed to δύναμις (Latin: potentia, possibility).  This 
difference could be translated as difference between the inner and 
outer, force and its expression, or essence and its appearance.  The most 
important thing to notice is that ἐνέργεια is not just one side of the 
opposition, but the process or activity in which the unity of both sides 
manifests itself.  It is the process of the transformation from real 
possibility to determinate reality.  Actuality, therefore, is neither 
something merely subjective, nor a mere object (ἔργον), but the process 
of the realization or instantiation of a subject and an object.  
Accordingly, actuality has to be thought of as the presence of self-
relatedness.  The self, οὐσία, is not a “backworld,” but the tendency 
toward a definite individual appearance, an appearance that presents a 
self (οἰκείωσις). 
(3) With this in mind, let us turn to Hegel, who defines Wirklichkeit 
as the unity of essence and existence.  This now is a matter of existence, 
which is no longer sheer positedness, but a being on its own terms.56  
This means that actuality is not a mere external objectivity determined 
by reflection, namely, an appearance solely of natural laws, but the 
process of self-determination that manifests itself (as opposed to the 
doctrine of the opacity of the self in Nietzsche too).  Where do we 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 139–158.  The entry in Michael Inwood, A Hegel 
Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 33–35, remains unhelpful to open up the 
systematic significance of this concept. 
55 See Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.6. 
56 Hoffmann, Hegel, 350–54. 
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encounter actuality?  In the presence of a self-relation.  In thinking this 
Aristotelian thought, Hegel does not fall behind Kant, but shows the 
solution to the main unresolved problem in Kant, namely, how to get 
logically to the actual I, which is not a pure principle but the unity of 
consciousness in general and the individual.  This demonstrates the 
thought that actuality is to be thought of as internal reflectiveness 
(inwardness) of existence, which, as posited, will be the concept 
(Begriff).  Now, self-determination, self-relation means that something 
is an identity of opposed moments.  But this is a contradiction.  Thinking 
actuality does not mean to avoid but to resolve contradictions.  That is 
why Hegel emphasizes that everything actual has contradiction within 
itself.  Avoiding contradiction would be the attempt to establish an 
unambiguous account of actuality by trying to tear apart the opposed 
sides (inner–outer, essence–appearance, and so on).  In contrast, Hegel 
shows that the actual is self-relation, and this self-relation is the positing 
and dissolving of contradiction (for example, as self-movement, self-
preservation, self-determination).  Resolving contradiction means that 
the opposed sides are thought of as mere moments of the self-movement 
(reflexivity) of the actual being.  Every concept involving the term “self” 
reflects actuality and has contradiction in itself.  However, as long as 
the objective validity of formal logic remains an unchallenged 
presupposition, actuality in Hegel’s terms is nonsense. 
(4) How can we then comprehend actuality?  Strictly speaking, one 
cannot point to it or refer to actuality as something of a kind, because 
referring implies the difference of reflection between that which 
determines and that which is determined.  Therefore, Hegel explains 
actuality at first as the absolute, which means not being in relation to 
something else.  Actuality is what presents itself, it is self-presentation, 
immediate manifestation.57  Therefore, comprehending something in its 
57 Heidegger’s motive to renovate the concept of λόγος can be regarded as 
an attempt to overcome the standpoint of reflection and its modelled 
objectivity so as to think actual being.  The λόγος is not a structure, a means for 
determination and control, but the medium of the “revealing of something” in 
its truth—in and as language (see Martin Heidegger, Logic: The Question of 
Truth, trans. Thomas Sheehan [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995], 
6–7; see also Ewald Richter, Heideggers Frage nach dem Gewährenden und 
die exakten Wissenschaften [Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1992], 104).  Of 
course, both λόγος and language cannot be grasped properly in the sphere of 
the logic of essence.  In Hegel’s terms, the proper logical topos of language is 
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actuality does not mean generating unequivocal determinacy or 
objectifying.  Rather, it is knowing which interprets something as 
presenting a self.  Actuality is not a possible object of scientific 
experience in Kant’s terms, or a Tatsache in Sachverhalten, as 
Wittgenstein puts it in the Tractatus, but an event (Ereignis).  This 
requires us to overcome the interest toward this being and to exercise a 
theoretical perspective (θεωρία), which means letting it be or present 
itself. 
(5) Here we find the limit of transcendental logic: Actuality in this 
sense cannot be justified in Kant’s transcendental logic.  The reason is 
that transcendental logic is nothing but the endeavor of substantiating 
the objective validity of formal logic, its principles (a) and forms (b): 
(a) The boundaries of knowledge, according to Kant, are the 
boundaries of the determining power of judgment or of the objective 
validity of the principle of noncontradiction.  Transcendental logic 
presupposes the objective validity of this principle.  The objectivity that 
is justified by Kant is just the object insofar it can be regarded as free of 
contradiction, as posited as an unequivocal element within a system of 
appearances.  This is why Kant, who departs from oppositions and 
equally sees the necessity of a unity of the opposed sides, encounters 
his unresolved problems. 
(b) As transcendental logic is a logic of the objectifying 
determination, it must regard the form of judgment as paramount in 
view of knowledge.  The “transcendental analytic,” which functions as 
the logic of truth, builds upon the form of judgment.  Hegel will point 
out that the form of judgment is inappropriate to present the 
speculative, which means the logical form as movement of the 
mediation of opposed determinations, for example, actuality as self-
relatedness.58  
 
I come to a close.  From Hegel’s point of view, transcendental logic 
substantiates only an abstract moment of actuality.  Kant’s 
the idea as “Entsprechung,” which is the living λόγος.  See Theodoros Penolidis, 
“Logos as Theoria: Notes on Hegel’s concept of the ‘speculative’,” in Synthesis 
Philosophica 43 (2007): 157–94. 
58  See Kurt Walter Zeidler, “Syllogismus est principium Idealismi,” in 
Dialektische Logik. Hegels „Wissenschaft der Logik“ und ihre 
realphilosophischen Wirklichkeitsweisen, ed. Max Gottschlich and Michael 
Wladika (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005), 239–51. 
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transcendental logic elucidates how formal logic has always been a logic 
of technical-practical knowledge.  Transcendental logic is the logic of 
our technical conduct, which shows what it must presuppose and how 
we must regard actuality—namely, as world of appearances—if we 
want to gain knowledge that serves as a means of domination.  But we 
must not forget that Kant enlightens us about the finitude of this 
standpoint in the Critique of Pure Reason and the other two Critiques.  
Practical reason, freedom, the living, the experience of beauty, as well 
as teleology, all have to be conceived as forms of self-relatedness.  As 
such, these forms cannot be conceived as free of contradiction.  The 
other Critiques approach actuality in the Hegelian sense—but in a 
logically unfounded way.  That is why Kant is eminently topical.  The 
spirit of our age is imbued with the myth of technology in all domains of 
our life.  This myth is the one-sided, abstract enlightenment, 59  the 
totalitarianism of the standpoint of utility or finite purposiveness. 60  
Kant’s transcendental logic is the first inner-logical step of the 
enlightenment of this myth.61 
University of Warwick, United Kingdom 
Catholic Private University Linz, Austria  
59  See Hegel’s critique of the Enlightenment in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit. 
60 Which is the basis of the primacy of the economic system over politics 
in the present age.  The “system of needs” (Hegel) is the system of realized finite 
purposiveness within the realm of freedom, which seems to be regarded as a 
secularized “kingdom of ends.” 
61 This article is a result of a research grant kindly given by the Austrian 
Science Fund (FWF), project number J 3510-G15. 
                                                     
